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THE PROPER DISPOSITION OF SEIZED
PAPERS AND EFFECTS
MICHAEL E. GELTNER*
When the Supreme Court of the United States abandoned the "mere
evidence" rule in 1967,1 it greatly expanded the categories of property
subject to seizure by government under color of law for use in judicial
proceedings.2 Although Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 3 its analogues in most state codes of criminal procedure,4
and a fairly well-developed body of case law5 tell us what should hap-
pen to papers and effects seized in violation of the fourth amendment
to the Constitution,6 the Supreme Court has not extensively considered
the proper disposition of lawfully seized property. The Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure do not address the issue, and only rarely and
confusingly do state codes of criminal procedure7 provide for the dispo-
sition of lawfully seized papers and effects. In recent years the United
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., 1963, University of Pennsylvania;
LL.B., 1966, Columbia University.
1. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
2. This expansion has continued in more recent decisions of the Court. In Andreson v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), and Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the Court re-
jected the view that the fifth amendment component of the decision in Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886), limits seizures of evidence. In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), the
Court also rejected limitations on the seizure power when evidence is the property ofa nonlitigant.
3. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) provides:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court for
the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property on the ground
that he is entitled to lawful possession of the property which was illegally seized. The
judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion.
If the motion is granted the property shall be restored and it shall not be admissible in
evidence at any hearing or trial. If a motion for return of property is made or comes on
for hearing in the district of trial after an indictment or information is filed, it shall be
treated also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.
4. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-12 (Smith-Hurd 1979); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. §
710.70 (McKinney 1971).
5. See notes 10-33 infra and accompanying text.
6. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S, CONST. amend. IV.
7. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 108-11 (Smith-Hurd 1979); OHio Rev. CODE ANN.
§§ 2933.27- .28 (Page 1975).
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States Courts of Appeals have more frequently, but unsatisfactorily,
ruled on the proper disposition of seized property either used' or sub-
ject to use9 as evidence in a criminal trial.
This article examines what the United States Constitution and other
laws mandate with respect to seized property both before and after its
use as evidence in litigation. This article also analyzes what should be
done with seized property that may be classified as both evidence (e.g.,
a fruit or instrumentality of a crime) and contraband. The latter in-
quiry requires exploration of the legal rationale of forfeiture and the
concept of contraband. This article concludes that governmental reten-
tion of seized property is no more than "a taking without compensa-
tion." Although some discrete and supportable reasons justify
governmental retention of property in certain instances, this characteri-
zation is generally the only honest description in the absence of a plau-
sible rationale for governmental retention of property seized under
color of law.
I. UNLAWFUL SEIZURE' 0
Suppose A has a cache of money in A's home and police enter with a
search warrant and seize the money for use in a criminal proceeding
against A. A concludes that the search warrant is invalid because the
underlying affidavit did not set out probable cause for the search. Sup-
pose further that A not only wants to prevent the prosecutor's use of the
money as evidence against A, but also wants the money back. In this
situation, the law spells out a fairly straightforward remedy. Rule 41(d)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that an inventory
be prepared upon seizure, that the inventory be verified, and that a
copy be provided by the magistrate to A on request. Rule 41(e) then
allows A, a "person aggrieved," to move for return of the money "on
the ground that he is entitled to lawful possession" of the property
8. See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 565 F.2d 1063 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
LaFatch, 565 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Premises Known As 608 Taylor Ave., Apt. 302, Pittsburgh, Pa.,
584 F.2d 1297 (3rd Cir. 1978); Shea v. Gabriel, 520 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1975).
10. Although the following discussion primarily focuses on search and seizure law in the
federal courts, the results of this discussion should be equally applicable, except for matters of
practice, to state courts, because the requirements of the fourth amendment have been made
applicable to the states by Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
11. The term "lawful possession," however, will operate to deny return of property in some
cases of unlawful seizure. One clear example is contraband; Le., something that is unlawful to
[Vol. 1979:833
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which was illegally seized."' 2 The rule also provides that if the court
orders return of the money, the money "shall not be admissible in evi-
dence at any hearing or trial."' 3
The complexity of a motion for return of unlawfully taken property
necessitates examination of the rule's antecedents to understand its op-
eration. Actions in trespass or replevin comprised the common-law
remedies for unlawful search and seizure. 4 Fourth amendment reme-
dies developed little in the nineteenth century. In Boyd v. United
States,'5 for example, a leading fourth amendment case in this era, the
Supreme Court did not give serious consideration to any remedy for an
invalid judicial order to produce evidence other than to declare it un-
constitutional.
The Court first seriously confronted the exclusionary rule in Adams v.
New York, 6 in which it held that a criminal defendant could not resist
admission of competent evidence because it had been obtained in the
possess. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1976) (narcotic drugs). It also seems certain that property seized
as evidence alone must be returned on a finding that it was illegally seized. A more difficult
problem is presented by property seized as a fruit or instrumentality of crime. Often this property
will be evidence of crime as well. It is not self-evident that this property cannot be lawfully
possessed; if it can, then the rule seems to require return. Later discussion of what should be done
with lawfully seized fruits or instrumentalities should guide the way here. See text following note
106 infra and text accompanying notes 130-60 infra.
12. See note 3 supra.
13. Id. This provision is probably an overstatement. As will be seen shortly, the fourth
,amendment requires the remedy stated in rule 41 (e), and the drafters drafted the rule to afford the
required remedy. See notes 20-22 infra and accompanying text. It can be expected, however, that
the Supreme Court, particularly the present Court, will not interpret the rule to deny admissibility
to 4's money if return is ordered, because the Constitution, as interpreted, does not require exclu-
,oon. If.4 successfully moves under rule 41(e) for return of his money on the ground that it was
illegally seized, its admission in a subsequent civil trial seems to follow from the limitation of the
exclusionary rule in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). Admission in grand jury proceed-
ings probably follows as well. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
It is unlikely that admissibility will be denied if the victim of the illegal seizure is the proponent
of the evidence. Further, it is likely that admission can be compelled by a subpoena duces tecum
over the victim's objection if knowledge of the evidence was not obtained by illegal search or
seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590
(1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
It is fair to predict, therefore, that the inadmissibility principle of rule 41(e) will apply only
when a motion to suppress would succeed; otherwise, the label on the motion would control ad-
missibility.
14. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1967). See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 2
Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765) (trespass); Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 205, 95 Eng.
Rep. 768 (1763) (trespass).
15. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
16. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
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course of an unconstitutional search or seizure.17 Ten years later the
Supreme Court decided Weeks v. United States.i" In Weeks, unlike
Adams, defendant moved pretrial for the return of property that he
claimed United States marshals had unlawfully seized in the course of
a warrantless search of his home. On this tenuous distinction, the
Court held that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for
return of property, because a court should not affirm by its decision a
constitutional violation.' 9
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United Statesz° established that the right
to physical repossession of property seized in violation of the fourth
amendment is legally equivalent to the right to insist on its suppression
as evidence at trial. The prosecutor in Silverthorne complied with the
trial court's order to return unlawfully seized evidence, but not before
he made copies of it and persuaded the trial judge to subpoena the
originals. The Supreme Court held invalid the contempt order for de-
fendant's violation of the subpoena duces tecum on the ground that the
contrary result would reduce the fourth amendment "to a form of
words."'" By the time of the Go-Bart decision,22 the remedies of return
and suppression for violations of the fourth amendment were settled
law. Some years later, however, the Wof decision,23 though it held the
fourth amendment applicable to state officers' conduct, 4 denied consti-
17. Defendant Adams was convicted of unlawful possession of policy slips. Policy slips and
private papers had been seized in the execution of a search warrant authorizing only the seizure of
policy slips. Defendant raised no motion for return of the property and raised no objection to the
introduction into evidence of the policy slips. Defendant claimed error in the trial court's overrul-
ing of an objection to admission of the private papers based on unlawful seizure. The Supreme
Court unanimously held that a court need not exclude otherwise competent evidence because of
the manner in which it was obtained. Id. at 594-96. The Court, in light of its disposition of the
case, did not decide whether the fourth and fifth amendments applied to the states.
18. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
19. Id. at 394-96. The Court also stated that the seizure of the private papers in Adams had
not violated the fourth amendment because it was incidental to the lawful seizure of the policy
slips. The fourth amendment legality of the seizure, however, had not been the ground of decision
in Adams. In suggesting that it could have been, id. at 395, Justice Day's opinion apparently
ignored Boyd's "mere evidence" rule.
20. 251 U.S. 390 (1920).
21. Id. at 392. The Court paid little more than lipservice attention to Adams v. New York.
22. Go-Bart Import Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (suppression and return of
illegally seized papers).
23. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
24. Wofoverruled Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), on this issue. The Weeks
Court, in discussing several items of evidence that police officers had seized and given to the
federal prosecutor, held the fourth amendment inapplicable to state police conduct. Id. at 398.
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tutional force to the federal law of remedies for violations of the fourth
amendment by state officers.
The reversal of Wolfs remedy rule in Mapp v. Ohio25 in 1962 seems
to establish the foregoing law of remedies as constitutionally required
on both federal and state levels. The most recent pertinent case is the
Bivens26 decision, which held that violation of the fourth amendment
gives rise to a cause of action for damages even in the absence of imple-
menting legislation.27  Although the Supreme Court never has flatly
stated so, it can hardly be doubted after this line of cases that the source
of the right to return of property seized in violation of the fourth
amendment is the Constitution itself, rather than rule or statute.
Several important consequences follow the conclusion that the re-
turn-of-property remedy is constitutionally based. First, the remedy is
enforceable against unlawful seizure by either federal or state officers.
Second, the remedy is enforceable in state courts, whose judges are re-
quired to enforce constitutional mandates.2" Third, the remedy is en-
forceable in federal court against federal officers, provided that general
federal question jurisdiction exists, and against state officers under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871.29
A special problem arises when there is an effort to assert in federal
court the right to return of property unlawfully seized by state officials
for use in a state criminal trial, because the Supreme Court has made
clear that its anti-injunction decisions prevent interference with ongo-
ing state prosecutions." The availability of a federal return order thus
may turn on whether a state prosecution, in which a party seeks to in-
troduce the seized property, is in progress.3'
25. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Defendant filed no motion for return in Mapp; the Supreme Court
held only that suppression was required.
26. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
27. Id. at 397.
28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (supremacy clause).
29. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976);
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976)). Although the substantive and jurisdictional portions of the Act have
been separately codified in titles 42 and 28, respectively, they were enacted together.
30. See Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Stefanelli
v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
31. The real reason behind the federal anti-injunction rule in this context is the desire to let
the court that has the litigation in front of it decide all the issues relevant to its resolution before
other courts interfere. Federalism and comity concepts are secondary to this notion, and the rea-
sons underlying the "hands-off" approach are much like those underlying the rule against appeals
of interlocutory orders, particularly in criminal cases. The appealability of orders granting and
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Although the Supreme Court in recent years has tampered consider-
ably with the law of fourth amendment remedies, 3z the tampering can
be explained by the tension between the goals of enforcing the fourth
amendment and convicting the guilty.33 Inasmuch as these values are
not counterweighted in a straightforward motion directed solely at the
return of unlawfully seized property, there is little reason to expect the
Court to change the present remedial structure for return of property.
II. LAWFUL SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE
Although the fourth amendment is the ultimate source of remedies
for unlawful seizure, it plays no role in the law of remedies for lawful
seizure. As a result, the lawful-unlawful determination ordinarily must
look to the legitimacy of the search, since the Supreme Court has virtu-
ally removed all limits on seizure of papers and effects, other than those
of probable cause and, where required, the prior decision of a magis-
trate. The history of this removal is an important backdrop to the dis-
cussion that follows.
In England, general warrant abuses led to strong feeling against
searches for evidence. This antipathy resulted in Lord Camden's opin-
ion in Entick v. Carrington,3 a which not only banned the general war-
rant, but also condemned searches for mere evidence.35 Several
scholars have demonstrated that Americans were well aware of this his-
denying motions for return of property, or for suppression on the ground of unlawful search or
seizure, has been often litigated. The Supreme Court has settled on a rule for federal cases by
which an appellate court may review return-of-property decisions only if the order was solely for
return of property; an appellate court cannot review these orders if the property seized relates to a
prosecution in esse. DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962). Although the D/Bella rule is
not always easy to apply to a criminal prosecution, see Shea v. Gabriel, 520 F.2d 879 (1st Cir.
1975), the reason behind the line-drawing effort is clear and would likely govern efforts to obtain
federal injunctive review of state seizures of property in state criminal proceedings.
32. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 99 S. Ct. 2627 (1979) (evidence from search incident to
an arrest pursuant to statute later held constitutionally invalid is admissable unless statute was
flagrantly unconstitutional); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) ("where the State has pro-
vided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner
may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an un-
constitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial"); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974) (witness before a grand jury may not refuse to testify on the ground that evidence was
obtained in unlawful search and seizure).
33. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 412-15 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
34. 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
35. This history is thoroughly summarized in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,312-15 (1967)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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tory during the drafting of the fourth amendment and sought to incor-
porate into our Constitution the rules announced by Lord Camden.36
The Supreme Court recognized the constitutional basis for the rule
against searches for "mere evidence" in 1886, grounding its decision on
both the fourth amendment and the fifth amendment proscription of
compulsory self-incrimination. 37 By the turn of this century, it was a
well-settled tenet of the Constitution that "mere evidence" was inade-
quate justification for search or seizure .3  The "mere evidence" rule
served privacy interests in two respects: it limited governmental inva-
sion of private places in that "limitations on the fruit to be gathered
tend to limit the quest itself";39 and it strengthened protection against
compulsory self-incrimination by permitting people to commit to writ-
ing, without fear of incrimination, information that they could not be
forced to divulge from their own mouths.
In 1967 the Supreme Court abandoned the "mere evidence" rule in
Warden v. Hayden4" as "wholly irrational" and unsupported by the
fourth amendment's language.4 Justice Brennan's opinion in this case
is a study in irony, because his later opinion in Andreson v. Maryland4 2
demonstrates that he saw the mere evidence rule as protecting a valued
fifth amendment right, which was not, due to the nature of the evidence
seized, involved in Warden v. Hayden. The relevant part of the case
concerned a seizure of clothing worn by a robber. Justice Fortas
pointed out that the whole case could have been decided under the "hot
36. See N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 103 (1937). Again, Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in
Y'arden P. Hayden provides the most readily available and scholarly summary. See 387 U.S. at
315-18.
37. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
38. T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 431-32 (7th ed. 1903). See Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921). Although well-settled, the rule often seems to have been ignored.
For example, in the Court's discussion of Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1914), Justice Day contended that the papers in Adams had
been lawfully seized and protected from inquiry by the rule against inquiry into collateral issues at
trial. Had the Court analyzed .4dams correctly under the Boydrule, it would have concluded that
the seizure of the private papers-as opposed to the contraband policy slips-violated the "mere
evidence" ban; thus, no mid-trial collateral inquiry into the circumstances of the search would
have been required because the "mere evidence" rule made possible automatic application of the
exclusionary rule.
39. United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930).
40. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
41. Id. at 301-02.
42. 427 U.S. 463, 484 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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pursuit" doctrine without overruling hoyd,43 but Justice Brennan, in-
fluenced strongly by scholarly criticism of the "mere evidence" rule,44
wrote a broad opinion that abolished the rule. By the time the "mere
evidence" issue actually came before the Court in Andresen v. Mary-
land, the Court already had undercut any fifth amendment protection
against self-incrimination in an earlier holding that a seizure does not
constitute compulsion under the fifth amendment.45 Justice Brennan's
opinion of the "mere evidence" rule was thus reduced to a dissent in
Andresen and an excellent brief in favor of the rule on fifth amendment
grounds.46 In 1978 the Supreme Court went one step further in Zurcher
v. Stanford Dail"7 to hold that the fourth amendment does not require
the government to secure evidence through a subpoena duces tecum
rather than through the more intrusive search warrant, even though the
premises to be searched are owned or occupied by a newspaper not
suspected of complicity in the crime under investigation.48 The
Zurcher majority's heavy reliance on the absence of precedents recog-
nizing third-party search and seizure limits is disingenuous because
during the regime of the "mere evidence" rule, it would not have been
necessary to inquire into the status of the possessor of the evidence, for
the evidence itself was immune to seizure.49
Because any seizable property that comes into plain view during the
course of a search based on probable cause is lawfully subject to war-
rantless seizure, particularly if the discovery is inadvertent,50 the only
limit on the government's right to take into custody papers and effects
that are thought to have some relevance to a criminal proceeding is
probable cause to believe that they have evidentiary value-an ex-
tremely loose standard. Searching agents, therefore, can be expected to
have custody of enormous quantities of property for evidentiary pur-
poses without claim to an interest in the property superior to either the
government or a complainant.51
43. 387 U.S. at 310-12 (Fortas, J., Warren, CJ., concurring).
44. Id. at 300 nn.6 & 7.
45. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
46. 427 U.S. at 484-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
48. Id. at 565.
49. See id. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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A. After Trial
Suppose governmental agents in the course of a lawful search seized
A's cache of money in the belief, supported by probable cause, that it
constitutes relevant evidence that B has committed a crime. B is
charged with the crime, brought to trial, and acquitted." This appears
to be the simplest case. The justification for authorizing seizure of A's
money is the need for it as evidence against B.13 Once A's money is no
longer needed as evidence against B, the state's justification for reten-
tion of the money fails and it should return the money to A.5 4 Put
another way, once the limited purposes sought to be achieved by the
abolition of the "mere evidence" rule have been accomplished, the
state's permanent retention of A's money simply amounts to a taking
without compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the Constitution.5 Furthermore, any delay in returning the
money to A is a taking of the investment value of A's money for
whatever period the state unnecessarily keeps it. As a result, the refusal
to return A's money and the failure to adopt procedures to assure its
prompt return both violate the Constitution.
The foregoing conclusions also hold true when B is convicted. The
underlying reason for taking A's money is identical with that in the first
example, and it similarly ceases to exist when a decision on the merits
resolves the case against B.5 6
Suppose that A's money is taken for use as evidence against A. 57
The same reasoning applies: the reason for taking A's money as mere
52. B is charged with defrauding others of money. The prosecution's attempt to prove B's
guilt includes evidence that B, without legitimate sources of money, spent cash that B allegedly
obtained from the fraudulent scheme on goods that B bought from A.
53. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 560 (1978); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 306-07 (1967).
54. See Bova v. United States, 460 F.2d 404, 406 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972); ALl MODEL CODE OF
PREARRAIGNMENT PROC. § 280.3 (1975).
55. See Lowther v. United States, 480 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir. 1973).
56. There is, of course, one major difference between the first and second example. B's ac-
quittal prevents further trial of B on the charge. B's conviction may lead to an appeal, which may
lead to reversal and retrial (unless reversal is based on insufficient evidence, see Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)). The prosecutor's retention of A's money for possible retrial should be
analyzed in the same way as any effort to hold evidence for trial. See notes 79-101 infra and
accompanying text.
57. Varying the earlier example, B has reached an agreement with the prosecutor to testify
that .4 was really the brains behind the scheme to defraud and that B had paid 4 the money as
part of the arrangement. .4 is prosecuted for aiding and abetting the fraud or for conspiracy, and
the money is to be introduced as evidence.
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
842 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
evidence against A ends with either A's acquittal or conviction, and 4's
right to return of the money proceeds on the same basis as before.5
The District of Columbia Circuit's decision in United States v. Wil-
son59 raises many of these points. Police, executing a search warrant,
raided Wilson's home and seized $2,725. After being indicted for drug
offenses, Wilson moved for return of the money, claiming it could not
be used as evidence against him "as it cannot be traced to criminal
conduct."6 Before the trial court could rule on the motion, Wilson
pleaded guilty to possession of drugs for distribution. He then renewed
the motion for return of property, which the trial court denied.6' Al-
though the government tried at trial to prove that defendant had
earned the money in narcotics traffic, it abandoned that position on
appeal.62 The court of appeals held that the trial court not only had the
jurisdiction, but also had a duty to return property "not alleged to be
stolen, contraband, or otherwise forfeitable, and which is not needed,
or is no longer needed, as evidence. ' '63 The appeals court reasoned that
it was "fundamental to the integrity of the criminal justice process that
property involved in the proceeding, against which no government
claim lies, be returned promptly to its rightful owner."'
Although the result in Wilson obviously was correct, its reasoning
exposes several of the problems that abound in this area. The court, for
example, correctly pointed out that the proceedings for return of prop-
erty were completely independent of those for unlawfully seized prop-
erty under rule 41(e);65 nevertheless, the court held that the trial court
had a duty to return the property, oddly enough, for exactly those rea-
sons66 advanced for adoption of the fourth amendment exclusionary
58. The same difference between acquittal and conviction exists in this variation as that dis-
cussed in note 56 supra. In addition, success may spur the prosecutor to claim that A's money has
more than evidentiary value. The prosecutor's attempt to retain A's money on this ground will be
discussed at length later. See notes 102-06 infra and accompanying text. A's conviction also may
lead the court to seek to retain A's money as security for a fine or as restitution for victims of the
crime. Cf. notes 107-23 infra and accompanying text (discussing the wrongdoer's rights to the
seized evidence).
59. 540 F.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
60. Id. at 1101.
61. Id. at 1102.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1101.
64. Id. at 1103.
65. Id. at 1104.
66. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1979:833
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rule.67 If the court had correctly perceived the basis for return, it would
have justified its holding on Wilson's fifth amendment right to return of
property for which he had never been compensated.6" Similarly con-
fusing is the crucial significance that the court attached to the govern-
ment's abandonment on appeal of its claim that Wilson had obtained
the money in the course of earlier illegal drug sales.69 That fact is rele-
vant not to Wilson's right to return of his money, but to the basis for
return. If, as conceded on appeal, Wilson's possession of the money
was not a result of prior crimes and, therefore, not evidence that he
possessed the drugs in question with intent to distribute, then the
seizure was unlawful and the right to return would be based on rule
4 1(e) and the fourth amendment, because even a broad reading of War-
den n. Hayden7" justifies only the seizure of papers and effects that are
evidence of crime.7 Conversely, if Wilson's money represented the
proceeds of prior crime and, therefore, tended to prove that Wilson's
possession of drugs on this occasion was for the purpose of sale, then
the government's right to seize it was based on its evidentiary value.72
67. See Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394
(1914). The Supreme Court's shift from "judicial integrity" to "police deterrence" as the ration-
ale for the exclusionary rule is a more recent development. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 99
S. Ct. 2627 (1979); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974).
68. The weakness of the court's rationale crops up again in its recognition of ancillary juris-
diction as one reason for its rejection of the government's argument that Wilson should be left to
pursue his local administrative and civil remedies for the return of his property because rule 41(e)
did not govern. If Wilson's right to return was based on the fifth amendment, the court would
have had an independent basis of federal jurisdiction, provided that Wilson pleaded the minimal
amount in controversy. See Davis v. Passman, 99 S. Ct. 2264 (1979). That result also would
follow if the claim rested on the fourth amendment. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
69. 540 F.2d at 1102.
70. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
71. The opinion does not reveal whether the warrant authorized seizure of the money or
whether the agents executing the warrant found the money, concluded it was evidence, and seized
it without other authorization. Within limits, police have the right to seize objects of evidentiary
value, although not described in the warrant, if in plain view. See generally Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v.
New York, 99 S. Ct. 2319 (1979). In light of the plain view doctrine, Warden v. Hayden may be
validly criticized on the ground that often the police, not the magistrate, decide which papers and
effects are evidence of crime; moreover, police can be expected to err on the side of overinclusion.
72. Although the court did not clearly articulate the point, the government's argument may
have been that the money, as proceeds of prior narcotics sales, was subject to retention as "fruits
of crime." If so, as we will see later, the argument ignores the rationale for retaining fruits of
crime. See notes 107-23 infra and accompanying text.
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When the need for the evidence ended with Wilson's conviction, his
right to return rested in the fifth amendment.
B. Before Trial
The rationale underlying seizure of mere evidence might appear to
bar any claims for return of property until its evidentiary use is ex-
hausted. In fact, the issue is much more complicated.
Suppose police lawfully seize A's money for use as evidence against
B, and trial of B is pending. A has several arguments to obtain the
return of his money before B's trial. A could argue that the police mis-
takenly believe that A's money is relevant and admissible evidence
against B. Although probable cause may be an adequate standard for
the lawfulness of a seizure, pretrial retention of the seized property de-
mands a higher standard of review-perhaps an adversary hearing. If
A's property is retained until after trial, A will suffer loss of use of the
property for the period from seizure to return. If, as in this example,
the seized evidence is money, A loses, at the very least, the interest that
could have been earned on the money had it been available to invest.
No authority has been found that requires the return of lawfully seized
property---even money-to be accompanied by payment of interest.73
As a result, it is easy to argue that the fifth and fourteenth amendments
to the Constitution require more than ultimate return of the seized evi-
dence. The "taking" of the investment value of the evidence should be
preceded by at least an adversary hearing that complies with due proc-
ess of law and applies a preponderance standard to the question of
whether A's property is relevant and admissible evidence in the pend-
ing case against B.74
A could also argue that even if A's property is evidence against B,
the case against B can proceed as well without as with A's property as
73. In fact, payment of interest should not be required. If the property has no unique charac-
teristics, it is not really needed as evidence in its present form and should be returned, perhaps
after making copies or stipulations to its seizure, rendering unnecessary the payment of interest. If
the property has unique evidentiary characteristics, its use would destroy its evidentiary value. As
a result, to require the government to pay interest or its equivalent on property that truly has
unique value as real evidence would be to impose a penalty on its retention. Although a penalty is
certainly appropriate for an unlawful seizure, it is not suitable for lawfully seized and retained
property.
74. See generally North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Lynch v. Household
Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
[Vol. 1979:833
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss3/14
DISPOSITION OF SEIZED PROPERTY
real evidence. Following the example, A might argue that the prosecu-
tion of B could go forward successfully with authenticated photocopies
of the money taken from A, together with testimony regarding the cir-
cumstances of the seizure. A might join this argument with a stipula-
tion from B that authenticates the seized property.
A rebuttal to this latter line of argument centers around the Supreme
Court's decision in Zurcher,75 which rejected the contention that police
must follow the least disruptive method of obtaining evidence pos-
sessed by a nonparty for use in court. Zurcher, however, does not pre-
cisely address the issue of pretrial retention of seized property. The
case holds simply that police need not demonstrate the inefficacy of a
subpoena duces tecum, which leaves the evidence in the owner's hands
until it must be brought to court on the day of use, before seizing the
evidence under warrant; the Court did not address the considerations
involved in retaining, rather than taking, seized property. In fact, the
Court had no reason to reach the point; although the warrant in
Zurcher authorized seizure of "[niegatives and photographs and
films,' 7 6 the police found only a photograph that already had been
published." Thus, the reasons that caused the Supreme Court not to
require the less disruptive alternative for police to obtain evidence do
not affect the issue of retention, at least not directly. It is easy to con-
cede, as the Zurcher Court concluded, that it is burdensome to require
police to demonstrate the need for seizure over subpoena when evi-
dence is in perhaps hostile hands with no guarantee of its safety.7"
Once the evidence is securely in police custody, however, Zurcher's
preoccupation with safeguarding evidence is inapposite, and a court
could then take the time to make a cautious decision whether the police
need to retain the evidence.
Zurcher does have one bearing on the pretrial retention issue. The
Court concluded that the difference between potential defendants
(targets) and nonparties (nontargets) does not affect the determination
whether search or seizure is proper. This conclusion seems to obtain
with equal ease on the question of police retention of property. No
known policy supports a distinction between the target and nontarget
75. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). See notes 47-49 supra and accompany-
ing text.
76, 436 U.S. at 551.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 561. See also id. at 568 n.I (Powell, J., concurring).
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on the evidence-retention issue. As a result, whatever conclusions we
apply to pretrial disposition of A's money taken as evidence against B
must also apply when the money is seized for use as evidence against
A.
A few courts have considered these issues, but have only confused
matters. Shea v. Gabriel9 is typical. Federal agents executed three
search warrants on Shea's premises in search for items associated with
unlawful gambling and seized cash ($4,368) and several documents 80
that suggested that Shea (or someone) had taken bets on football
games. The government did not initiate criminal proceedings against
Shea, but a grand jury had begun to investigate unlawful gambling ac-
tivities. When Shea filed a complaint seeking suppression and return of
the seized property,8' the government resisted disclosure of the affidavit
underlying the search warrants, arguing that disclosure would endan-
ger the ongoing grand jury investigation.82 The district judge examined
the affidavit in camera, found it "colorable," and denied its disclo-
sure.83 The court also refused suppression or return because "'the le-
gitimate and appropriate governmental interest [in] using the property
as evidence before the grand jury'" outweighed the prejudice to Shea
in delayed return.8 4 The court of appeals noted in passing that no for-
feiture proceeding had started,85 but affirmed because the district court
had (1) balanced the government's secrecy interest against Shea's tem-
porary property loss, (2) examined the affidavit in camera, (3) dismissed
the motion without prejudice, and (4) found that Shea had failed to
show under rule 41(e) that he was entitled to lawful possession of the
property.86
79. 520 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1975).
80. Id. at 879 n.l.
81. The purported jurisdictional bases were rule 41(e) and the court's "inherent power to
discipline its officers." Id. at 880.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The decision was without prejudice to renewal of the motion should the government
fail to proceed with reasonable dispatch. Id. at 880 n.4.
85. Id. at 881. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (1976). As we will see later, forfeiture
proceedings must be commenced promptly. If the government has not done so, it cannot defend a
motion for return on the ground that the property is forfeitable. See notes 152-56 infra and ac-
companying text. As a result, any case that arguably concerns forfeitable property that is not the
subject of a forfeiture proceeding must be examined as if the sole issue is whether the property is
mere evidence.
86. 520 F.2d at 882.
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The First Circuit's analysis of the merits,"7 like that of the district
court, gave little if any thought to the basis for the motion. The court
failed to consider whether Shea had a right to return of the property in
the absence of a fourth amendment violation. Yet, the opinion's reli-
ance on the district judge's approach of balancing the government
needs against Shea's property claims suggests that the court of appeals
considered values other than those underlying the fourth amendment.
A more analytically sustainable approach would have been for the
court to distinguish between the fourth and fifth amendment bases of
Shea's claims.8 The first question should have been whether Shea suf-
fered a violation of his fourth amendment rights. Probable cause to
believe that there was evidence at the places searched would be the
only legitimate basis to sustain the seizures.8 9 Shea's motion for return
87. The court of appeals devoted a substantial portion of its analysis to the appealability
issue, concluding that insofar as the action sought suppression at trial, cf United States v. Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (denial of grand jury suppression), it was not appealable, and insofar as
the action sought return of property, see United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971), the appeala-
bility question was close enough to justify consideration of the merits. Appealability and interpre-
tation of the DiBella in esse doctrine, see note 31 supra, is beyond the scope of this article, but the
court's decision on this point seems foolish. If the appeals court had concluded that rule 41(e)
required return of property because of an unlawful search or seizure, it is hard to find a policy
supported by the district court's adherance to its order denying trial suppression. Assuming the
court of appeals would adhere to its unlawful search and seizure conclusion, it would then have to
reverse any conviction obtained at a trial in which the district court admitted the evidence. The
opposite and more sensible result would be for the district court to reverse itself on the basis of the
court of appeal's finding of a fourth amendment violation, which certainly constitutes appellate
review of the original "interlocutory" order.
88. In fairness to the court, it should be pointed out that these distinctions do not appear to
have been made by Shea's counsel.
89. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
The district judge is also subject to severe criticism for his failure to make a probable cause deter-
mination. To refuse disclosure to a property owner who seeks return or suppression denies him
both the opportunity to argue effectively the lack of probable cause and to challenge the validity
of the affidavit by going behind its face. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). It thus
renders the proceedings ex parte and relegates the judge's task to nothing more than what the
magistrate already has done. Seegeneral4, United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir.
1973). The Supreme Court never has recognized an executive privilege or law enforcement privi-
lege in this circumstance and should not. The privilege regarding an informant's identity is ex-
plainable because the informant's identity is irrelevant to the issue of whether the affiant, whose
identity and sworn statement are disclosed, had adequate reason to believe the informant. See
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Rugendorfv. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964). There
may be a limited national security privilege applicable to fourth amendment cases. Compare Al-
derman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), with Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316
(1969), and Butenko v. United States, decided sub nom. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. at
197-200 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). The Supreme Court, however, never has applied
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of property entitled him to a resolution of this issue, but he received
none. Rather, the district court, sustained by the court of appeals, ap-
plied a balancing test and found the affidavit "colorable" with "equita-
ble and practical considerations" tilting the balance in favor of the
government.90
Assuming no fourth amendment violation, the second issue should
have been whether the government, under the fifth amendment due
process clause, had a right to keep Shea's property without compensa-
tion. This is a particularly important issue when there is no pending
prosecution or there is reason to believe that a long delay will occur
before any post-trial return or before the government makes a decision
not to charge a crime and returns the property. Because Shea suffered
a taking, the court's determination should have been based on a higher
standard than the existence of probable cause to believe that the seized
property would become admissible evidence in a criminal prosecution;
moreover, the court should have made the determination by the proce-
durally correct preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
Even if the court had decided these issues against Shea, it should
have considered whether photocopying of the paper evidence9 (per-
haps with waiver of any objections grounded in the best evidence rule,
to its authenticity) could have adequately served the government's need
to use it during the investigation, before the grand jury, or at trial.
Much of this analysis was followed in the Third Circuit's recent deci-
sion in the Margolis92 case. As in Shea, government agents, while exe-
cuting a warrant for evidence and gambling contraband, seized $11,975
in cash. Three months later Margolis moved for return of property on
the ground that its retention violated his fifth amendment rights to due
a national security privilege to deny the subject of a search the information necessary to challenge
a probable cause determination.
90. 520 F.2d 879, 880 (1st Cir. 1975).
91. As mentioned before, there is little need for "real evidence" when its existence can be
demonstrated or is admitted. See text following note 74 supra. Some seized evidence, of course,
cannot be replaced by copies. A claim of forgery in a document, for example, would suggest that
the jury should be able to examine the original for itself. Other items are legitimate subjects of
tests or experiments at or before trial, for which there can be no substitute. Some "real evidence"
may be needed for its "graphic" value, although its shock value sometimes may be as good a
reason to not present it to the jury. It is hard, however, to see how the government's need for the
evidence seized in Shea, 520 F.2d at 879 n.1, would not have been served by photocopies had Shea
stipulated to their authenticity and waived any "best evidence" objections.
92. United States v. Premises Known As 608 Taylor Ave., Apt. 302, Pittsburgh, Pa., 584 F.2d
1297 (3rd Cir. 1978).
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process. The district court read Shea to hold that government retention
of the property violated due process only if the government's delay in
commencing a proceeding took on "unreasonable proportions."93
Finding three months reasonable, the court denied the motion.94 The
district court subsequently denied Margolis' renewed motion, without
prejudice to further renewal, over four months later, noting that delays
of up to two years in gambling investigations often occur.95
On appeal, Margolis renewed his argument that the government's
retention of his property violated due process. He also argued that the
government should be required to return the property if its evidentiary
value could be preserved by other means, and suggested that even if the
investigation required the actual bills seized, he should be paid for
them.
The court of appeals pointed out that because the government had
not instituted proceedings against Margolis, retention of his property
amounted to de facto forfeiture.96 The court nevertheless relied on its
supervisory power over law enforcement officials and the United States
Attorney's office to hold that retention was proper so long as it was
reasonable.97 Also on the basis of its supervisory power, however, the
court accepted Margolis' suggestion that the district court should have
considered alternative methods of preserving the evidence; 9 thus, it re-
manded the case to the court for consideration of the purposes for
which the government needed to retain the property.99
Although Judge Hunter's opinion for the court makes good sense,
the concurrence of Judge Rosenn commands even more respect. Judge
Rosenn argued that the purpose of the court's supervisory power is to
provide remedies for violation of existing rules; thus, the only basis for
the return of Margolis' property was the due process clause. 10° Curi-
ously, Judge Rosenn's due process analysis led him to the same conclu-
93. Id. at 1300.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1301-02.
97. Id. at 1302.
98. The court used the example of a bystander to a robbery whose car bore the robber's
fingerprints. Id. at 1303. It concluded that the government could seize the car to conduct a finger-
print test, but once it completed the test and took photographs of the fingerprints, the government
should return the car because the owner's interest in its possession and use outweigh the govern-
ment's need for its retention. Id.
99. Id. at 1304.
100. Id. at 1305-06.
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sion as the majority's--due process violations turn on whether
retention is reasonable. "Reasonableness" analysis, however, ignores
the underlying basis for the property owner's right to return of prop-
erty. If keeping A's goods for two years is a "taking," it is also a taking
to keep A's goods for one year even if one year is a reasonable time
during which to conduct an investigation. Retention is also a "taking"
even if A's property is so unique that there is no feasible way to substi-
tute for its evidentiary value.
The point that the cases fail to recognize is that A should be compen-
sated for loss of the property during the period that it is withheld as
well as for the property itself if it is not returned. Neither do the cases
seem to recognize that there should be a different substantive standard
for seizure, which the Zurcher court explains is proper under the threat
of loss or destruction of evidence, than for retention, when there is time
for an adversary hearing.10' Even when a taking of property is permis-
sible, it can be accomplished only in compliance with due process of
law.
III. NONEVIDENTIARY SEIZURES AND RETENTIONS
The classic objects of search and seizure prior to Warden v. Hay-
den'"2 were fruits of crime, instrumentalities of crime, and contra-
band. 0 3 Examined together, the reasons for permitting their search
and seizure become apparent. Those reasons, in turn, shed light on the
proper disposition of seized property. In all three categories the gov-
ernment's fundamental justification for seizure is that either the gov-
ernment itself or a claimant on whose behalf the government acts holds
a superior claim to ultimate possession (as opposed to temporary pos-
session in the case of evidence) of the seized property. 1°4 Fruits of
crime are subject to seizure because the victim of the crime has a
101. Supreme Court due process decisions have long recognized the propriety of immediate
administrative action, when necessary, if subsequently followed by a due process hearing at which
the earlier action's continued validity can be challenged. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
102. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
103. Common law also recognized a fourth category of seizable items-goods liable to cus-
toms duties and concealed to avoid payment. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
Discussion of the justification for this category of objects subject to seizure is beyond the scope of
this article, except to point out that the government's status as a lien holder justifies seizure to
create a possessory lien. See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
104. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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greater claim to ultimate possession of the property than the person in
whose custody it is found. Contraband is subject to seizure because the
state, having declared private possession unlawful, has a greater claim
to possession than the person in whose custody the contraband material
is found; indeed, it has the only claim to possession. Similarly, an in-
strumentality of crime, when subject to forfeiture, is subject to seizure
because the government has a greater claim to ultimate possession than
the person in whose custody it is found." 5
Any one of these categories can be-and often is-evidence of crime
as well. Police for example, may seize money from A because it is a
fruit of a bank robbery. A's possession of the money, however, also
may be strong evidence that A committed the robbery. Similarly, po-
lice may seize heroin from A because it is contraband, but A's posses-
sion of the heroin also will be strong evidence of the possessory offense
of unlawful possession of heroin. Indeed, it is difficult to envision any
case in which A's possession of the heroin will not be evidence, unless a
prosecutorial decision has been made not to charge A for the posses-
sory offense.
In addition to the need for evidence, many seizures can be justified
on more than one of the classic rationales for seizure. If A is claimed to
have robbed a bank with a sawed-off shotgun, seizure of the weapon
can be justified either on its status as an instrumentality of crime or on
its status as contraband. 0 6 The weapon may also be evidence that A
committed the crime of bank robbery as well as the possessory offense.
As discussed in the previous section, strong arguments exist for the
return of property seized on the evidence justification both before and
after trial. When the property is seized as evidence of a crime as well as
on one or more of the last three grounds, the property's retention may
be justified under circumstances in which its character merely as evi-
dence might call for its return. As a result, it is important to define
carefully the three categories and to consider when their rationales per-
mit police retention of seized property.
A. Fruits of Crime
Because a thief can neither obtain nor pass along to another person
105. See generally Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306 n. 11(1967).
106. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861, 5848 (1976).
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the right to possession of stolen property, 0 7 the victim of the theft
holds a superior claim to possession. By seizing the property, the gov-
ernment acts on the victim's behalf.'08 Permitting the police to do so
makes sense because the victim's exercise of his right to self-help' 0 9
often may be dangerous, and the victim's reliance on a civil action for
return of stolen property or for the tort of conversion frequently will
offer nothing more than theoretical value.
Once it is seen that the fruit-of-crime justification for seizure is the
victim's claim to the property, the limits of the category become appar-
ent: if the victim has no claim to return of the property, its seizure
cannot be justified by the duty of police to secure it for its rightful own-
er. As a result, the proceeds of most consensual crimes should not be
subject to seizure on the fruit-of-crime rationale because the "victim"
or person from whom the proceeds were gained, being inpari delicto, 10
has no greater claim to possession of the property than the person in
whose custody the property is found.
Suppose A is a prostitute, and police have probable cause to believe
that A has $100 received from B for services rendered. If the police
seek to search for and seize the $100 for the sole reason that they wish
to secure B's right to repossess the money, the magistrate should deny
the warrant. If, however, the police request the warrant on the grounds
that the $100 is both evidence and fruit of a crime, the warrant should
be issued on the former ground. Following the scenario, suppose A is
then charged and convicted of the offense of prostitution and moves
after trial for return of the $100. Because its seizure and retention were
justified only as evidence of crime, the money must be returned when it
is no longer needed as evidence. It cannot be kept on a fruit-of-crime
theory; nor can it be given to B, who has no valid claim to it. As a
result, A's post-trial motion for return should be granted. Had A
moved for return pretrial, the analysis would not differ from that for
property seized solely on an evidence rationale.
The disposition of property seized as fruit of a crime turns on
whether it can be properly characterized in this manner and on whether
107. Seegeneral, 73 CJ.S. Public Administrative Bodies & Procedures § 15(b)(4) (1951 & 1978
Supp.). One exception to this rule recognizes superior title to money in one who has obtained it in
good faith from a thief. See Holly v. Missionary Soc'y, 180 U.S. 284 (1901).
108. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306 n.11 (1967).
109. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06 (1962).




DISPOSITION OF SEIZED PROPERTY
the property seized is actually the fruit of a crime. Resolution of the
latter question is often difficult because of its procedural interrelation-
ship with the defendant's guilt. The cases on this question are some-
what confusing.
A recent case from the Sixth Circuit is a good example."' LaFatch
was charged in federal court with extortion. In the course of their in-
vestigation, F.B.I. agents seized $50,000 from LaFatch, which the trial
court held in custody pending trial. After his acquittal, LaFatch moved
that the trial court order return of the $50,000 to him. The alleged
extortion victim appeared and opposed LaFatch's motion and also filed
a separate lawsuit in state court for the $50,000. The trial judge with-
held action on the motion for return pending the outcome of the civil
lawsuit. After the state court jury awarded the victim $15,000, the
criminal trial judge concluded that the state judgment was res judicata
on the issue of entitlement to the money and ordered its return to
LaFatch.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the interests of judicial
efficiency dictate that the criminal trial court should resolve the ques-
tion of proper disposition of seized property," I but held that, although
the trial court was correct in its ruling that LaFatch's acquittal estab-
lished his right to the money," 3 it had erred in following the state
court's judgment. Judge Weick dissented on the latter ground, arguing
that the state judgment was entitled to full faith and credit."I4
In large part, the majority and dissent were both correct. A jury's
failure to reach a guilty verdict in a criminal prosecution is not res judi-
cata against the victim on any issue of law in a civil action. That the
jury did not find the evidence sufficient to establish guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt does not mean that the evidence would be insufficient in
a civil action under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard." 5
Furthermore, the victim, who was not a participant in the criminal ac-
tion, cannot be bound by the jury's verdict." 6 Thus, the majority rule
111. United States v. LaFatch, 565 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1977).
112. Id. at 83. The court of appeals recognized that "seized property, other than contraband,
should be returned to its rightful owner once the criminal proceedings have terminated." Id.
(citing McSurly v. Ratliff, 398 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1968)).
113. Id. at 84-85.
114. Id. at 85.
115. See id. at 84-85. See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938); United States
v. Burch, 294 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1961). But see Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886).
116. See Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. University Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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does not view a criminal acquittal as having res judicata or collateral
estoppel effect on the civil claim. On the other hand, the court holding
the property has no real interest in it other than to see to its proper
disposition. As a result, the issue in LaFatch may be recast in terms of
whether the trial court correctly deferred to the state court. If it did,
then the trial court properly granted resjudicata effect to the state judg-
ment; in this case ancillary jurisdiction in the trial court makes sense
much as it did in the previously discussed situations. " 7 Ancillary juris-
diction should not be invoked, however, to deny whatever procedural
rights the alleged crime victim might have in an independent civil ac-
tion; thus, the district judge's preference in LaFatch for the victim's
state right to jury trial over his prior decision to defer judgment on the
motion for return of property also makes sense.
United States v. Palmer"8 presents almost the opposite side of
LaFatch. At the time of Palmer's arrest for bank robbery, police seized
cash and other property from him. Unlike LaFatch, Palmer was con-
victed. The government opposed his post-trial motion for return of
property, but the bank made no effort to intervene and the trial court
denied the motion, leaving the money with the government. The court
of appeals reversed." 9 The appeals court noted that the guilty verdict
did not carry with it any civil adjudication of liability to the victim
bank, and held that because no claim of forfeiture had been made,
neither the government nor the court could hold the money in the ab-
sence of any adverse claim of ownership or right to possession. 20
It may first rankle, as it did the prosecutor in Palmer, to see a guilty
person get the money, and in that sense it is a harder case than that of
LaFatch, who was acquitted.' 2' On closer examination, however, the
court of appeals obviously was correct because its decision turned on
the absence of a claimant to the seized property when its evidentiary
role had been completed. Even so, the court's suggestions on the limits
of res judicata, assuming there had been a claimant to the property,
may be overstated. Suppose A is charged with robbing bank B, which
117. See United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d 1100, 1103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1976); notes 52-72 and
accompanying text.
118. 565 F.2d 1063 (9th Cir. 1977).
119. Id. at 1065.
120. Id. at 1064-65.
121. The result in LaFatch may be explained in that the court, although eschewing any views
on guilt or innocence, recited the evidence in a manner that makes its belief of LaFatch's guilt
obvious. See 565 F.2d at 84.
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claims that the money seized from A is the proceeds of the bank rob-
bery. Suppose A contests guilt and testifies that the money is A's, de-
rived from an innocent source, and A's testimony is countered by
testimony that all the money seized from A was "bait money.' ' 2 2 If on
this evidence the jury convicts A of bank robbery, it will have decided
the crucial questions relevant to the disposition of the property. As a
result, if bank B intervenes and opposes 4's post-trial motion for return
of property, the court should return the money to bank B, because
there is no reason why res judicata should not run against somebody
found guilty.1 23
The Palmer court, however, did not have to determine the limits of
res judicata because of the absence of an adverse claimant. Moreover,
even a conclusion of res judicata on Palmer's guilt would not lead to
collateral estoppel on the issue of ownership of the money, assuming
that no evidence in the record tied it to the bank. The ownership issue
would have to be decided in a separate evidentiary hearing.
B. Contraband
The rationale for seizure of contraband is that the state's claim to
immediate, as well as ultimate, possession of an object whose posses-
sion the legislature has declared illegal is greater than that of the pos-
sessor. The justification for the state's power to declare contraband lies
in its police power and the view that the mere possession of certain
objects should be criminalized because of their tendency to cause
harm.1 24 The most obvious example is the possession of dangerous
drugs. A possessory offense actually is an inchoate offense that has
taken on a life of its own; the state's disapproval often stems not from
the unequivocal dangerousness of the object, but from the possessor's
intention to use it, as with burglar's tools.
If the justification for seizure is the ban on possession, then there is
no basis for the return of contraband because the ban on possession is
continuing. As a result, even the victim of an unlawful search or
122. An example of "bait money" is money whose serial numbers have been recorded in the
bank before the robbery.
123. See Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors, 340 U.S. 558, 569 (1951); Kaufman v. Moss,
420 F.2d 1270, 1274 (3rd Cir. 1970).
124. If this is the rationale, there may be certain limits on the state's power to declare contra-
band. See, e.g., Warden %'. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306 n.l 1 (1967).
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seizure of contraband has no valid claim to return of property t2 either
before or after trial. That conclusion is likewise true after lawful
seizures.
Ordinarily, the only ground on which allegedly contraband property
can be returned is that the property is not, in fact, contraband. 26 In the
Second Circuit's oft-cited decision in In re Brenner,2 7 government
agents seized liquor from Brenner and filed two indictments for unlaw-
ful possession and use. He was tried and convicted in district court, but
his conviction was reversed on appeal because the statute then in force
did not proscribe Brenner's possession of the liquor in the absence of a
charge that he possessed it for sale. 28 The court of appeals directed the
district court to dismiss all charges against Brenner, and Brenner subse-
quently petitioned the district court for return of the liquor, alleging
that it had been unlawfully seized without a warrant. The district court
denied the motion, but the court of appeals ordered return of the liquor
on the ground that its earlier decision was res judicata on the issue of
Brenner's lawful possession of the liquor. 29
C. Instrumentalities of Crime
The state's claim to seize instrumentalities of crime is based on its
right to seek their forfeiture. The forfeiture concept itself derives from
the medieval idea that inanimate objects which cause harm are guilty
of wrongdoing and must be forfeited as deodand. 30 There is a strong
temptation to dismiss deodand forfeiture as medieval mumbo jumbo
until one reads Justice Holmes searching consideration of the common-
law development of forfeiture.' 3' Holmes traced the history of forfei-
ture into the Old Testament and explored the process that led to the
125. See note 3 supra.
126. The only other situation in which contraband property can be recovered arises when the
party claiming title has a privilege to possess the substance or object. A medical researcher, for
example, may be privileged under statute or administrative decision to possess a drug, possession
of which is generally prohibited. In this situation the drug is not contraband in the researcher's
hands and the contraband label should not be sufficient to justify seizure or retention.
127. 6 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1925).
128. Brenner v. United States, 287 F. 636 (2d Cir. 1922).
129. 6 F.2d at 426. The court of appeals also found that the search and seizure was unlawful.
Id. This finding was unnecessary because the government had no basis other than unlawful pos-
session to retain Brenner's liquor.
130. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 (1971); Gold-
smith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921).
131. 0. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 6-36 (1881).
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treatment of animals and inanimate objects as guilty of crime when
they caused harm. He observed that it would seem to be a fallacy to
say of an inanimate object that "'she did it and she ought to pay for
it,' 132 but Holmes demonstrated that terminology of this sort appears
again and again in decisions of great judges. 133 The reason, he pointed
out, is that the law proceeds through apparent syllogisms, but its essen-
tial content is legislative; the policy behind the form may change, dic-
tating a change in content, but the form itself remains despite its
original content's being outmoded. 134
Whatever the history of forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime, its
present justification is crime prevention. When government seizes the
instrumentality of crime from an offender's hands, the forfeiture acts as
a punishment. When an instrumentality is seized from a noncriminal,
the forfeiture serves to deter association with criminals and denies
criminals the instrumentality with which to commit crime.
The penalty justification is carefully exposed in Justice Harlan's
opinion in United States i' United States Coin & Currency.'35 After
defendant-Angelini had been convicted of failing to register and pay
the federal gambling tax, the government started forfeiture proceedings
against the $8,674 seized at his arrest. Angelini appealed the district
court's forfeiture order on the ground that he could properly invoke his
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the forfeiture
proceeding in light of the Court's decisions 36 between his conviction
and the forfeiture proceeding that the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is a valid defense to a prosecution for failure
to comply with the statute under which he was convicted.
The government argued that Angelini could not assert this privilege
because the forfeiture proceeding was a civil action against the object
rather than a penal proceeding against Angelini. The Court held that
there was no constitutional difference between a fine of $8,674 and a
forfeiture of $8,674; 137 each resulted from a proceeding criminal in na-
132. Id. at 28.
133. Id. at 29.
134. fd. at 35.
135, 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
136, Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39
(1968).
137. 401 U.S. at 718.
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The government also argued that even if the "criminal penalty" label
might be generally accurate, it was not applicable to the particular for-
feiture statute,139 which mandated forfeiture of property even if the
owner of the property had nothing to do with the illegal activity.'
40
The Court responded that for the government to sustain this argument,
it would have to demonstrate that the broad sweep of this forfeiture
statute was consistent with the due process and just compensation
clauses of the fifth amendment.' 4 ' The Court, however, did not reach
the due process and just compensation issues;142 rather, it construed the
statute to allow a defendant in a forfeiture proceeding to invoke the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
43
The Coin & Currency decision probably cannot be read as holding
that the only justification for forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime is
to penalize the criminal. 44 The Court also cited with approval two
earlier decisions that sustained in principle the forfeiture of
automobiles used in crime over the security interests of nonparticipants
in the crime. 14  Nevertheless, important consequences flow from the
Court's recognition of forfeiture as a penalty. Perhaps the most impor-
138. Id. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, relied heavily on Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 634 (1886), to reach this conclusion.
139. 401 U.S. at 718 (referring to proceedings under 26 U.S.C. § 7302 (1976)).
140. Id. at 719.
141. Id. at 720.
142. Id. at 721.
143. Id. at 721-22.
144. Id. The Court's holding that forfeiture is a punishment for crime precludes the argu-
ment, occasionally heard, that forfeiture, as an archaic remnant of the Middle Ages, violates the
Constitution. Forfeiture of crime instruments used to further criminal conduct is unconstitutional
to the extent that other punishment is unconstitutional. This area of the law, despite some starts,
has developed little. Compare Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), with Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514 (1968).
145. 401 U.S. at 715 (citing United States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. 321 (1926); Goldsmith-
Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921)). The latter case sustained the forfeiture of a taxi
used for unlawful liquor distribution, taking the interest of the seller who had retained title for
unpaid purchase money. The former case involved the seizure of an automobile used to conceal
liquor with intent to defraud the United States of tax. The Court held that there was no protection
of the innocent interest. 272 U.S. at 332-33. But see United States v. One Ford Coach, 307 U.S.
219 (1939), in which the majority invalidated a similar forfeiture under a different statute, but on
the ground that the statute absolved the credit company because it had made adequate inquiry
into the background of the buyer to assure that the automobile would not be used in bootlegging,
Justices Douglas, Frankfurter, and Black dissented, but solely over the Court's interpretation of
the statute's remission provisions. No member of the Court suggested that the forfeiture would be
unconstitutional, although Justice McReynolds, writing for the majority, did comment that
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss3/14
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tant is that forfeiture, at least under federal law, must be based on stat-
ute rather than on the common law. 146 Although the Supreme Court
has not specifically adopted or rejected this position, it is logically cor-
rect. Furthermore, it provided the basis for resolution of the litigation
concerning the notorious weapons with which Lee Harvey Oswald is
claimed to have killed President John F. Kennedy and Officer Tippit.
Shortly after the shootings, the government took into custody the weap-
ons alleged to have been used in the crimes. After Oswald's death, his
widow, acting as his administratrix, sold to King the estate's claim to
the weapons. A federal district court granted the government's request
for forfeiture,' 47 but the Fifth Circuit reversed.' 48 Chief Judge Tuttle,
writing for the court of appeals, characterized the issue as whether the
government could obtain the weapons by forfeiture without compensa-
tion, or whether it must resort to condemnation and compensate the
owner. He conceded that it would be quick and easy to accept the gov-
ernment's deodand theory, but because the case could not be fitted
under a forfeiture statute, the court could not accept this theory. 1
4 9
Judge Doyle later reiterated this conclusion in the district court's deci-
sion on King's action for compensation from the United States: "judi-
cial forfeiture has had little acceptance in the United States, and it is
generally held that the remedy must be through statutory proceed-
ings."' 50
When an instrument of crime is seized, a motion for its return is
possible either before or after trial. Based on the foregoing analysis,
the motion for return of property seized solely as an instrument of
crime can only be resisted on the ground that it is statutorily subject to
forfeiture.' 5' Even then the state may be unable to resist forfeiture if it
"'[lorfeitures are not favored; they should be enforced only when within both letter and spirit of
the law." Id. at 226.
146. King v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 767, 771 (D. Colo. 1968). The view that penal laws
must be statutory derives from the concept of fairness, but the proscription of federal common-law
crimes is also based on historical opposition to the growth of federal criminal law. Most states
also require penal laws to be statutory. Seegeneralgy H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION (1968).
147. King v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 767 (D. Colo. 1968), rev'd, 364 F.2d 235 (5th Cir.
1966).
148. King v. United States, 364 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1966).
149. Id. at 241.
150. 292 F. Supp. at 772.
151. A recent decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Farrell, No. 78-
1279 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 27, 1979), in which the author was supervising counsel, reaffirms this view.
Farrell went to a bogus fencing operation run by police and turned over $5000 in what his trial
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did not commence forfeiture proceedings in a timely manner. Courts
fairly consistently insist that the state must promptly begin forfeiture
proceedings, even with respect to property forfeitable as an instrument
of crime; otherwise, the claim that the property is subject to forfeiture
cannot be asserted as a defense to a motion for return.' 5 2
Although the most commonly used federal forfeiture statute compels
prompt implementation of forfeiture proceedings,- 3 many cases sug-
jury concluded was an attempt to buy heroin for redistribution. Farrell was ultimately convicted
of attempting to possess heroin for purposes of distribution and attempted distribution. United
States v. Farrell, No. 76-236 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 1976), aj'd, No. 76-1890 (D.C. Cir. May 23, 1977).
After trial and affirmance of his conviction, Farrell moved for return of the money, which had
been admitted in evidence against him at the criminal trial and kept in police custody thereafter.
District Judge Gesell denied the motion because the money had been used as an instrumentality
of crime. United States v. Farrell, No. 76-236 (D.D.C. Feb. 15, 1978). The court of appeals exten-
sively discussed the government's argument that because the money had been used as an instru-
mentality of crime, it was a species of "derivative contraband," which should be forfeited despite
the absence of a forfeiture statute governing the situation. The court of appeals concluded that
there was "no precedent for confiscation without statutory authority" of "derivative contraband"
(or crime instruments) and declined to fashion any such rule.
The court did, however, refuse to order return of the money, holding, by analogy to contract
cases in which courts refuse to enforce unlawful contracts, that it would "deny the aid of the courts
to a single violator of the law who seeks the return of money paid to a government agent in an
attempt to contract for the purchase of contraband drugs." United States v. Farrell, No. 78-1279
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 27, 1979) (footnote omitted). The opinion does not define the limits of its princi-
ple that the law will not aid a wrongdoer to recover his property, although its analysis suggests
that the court had in mind only the case in which the property sought by the motion to return was
delivered voluntarily as part of an illegal, but aborted, agreement.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Premises Known As 608 Taylor Ave., Apt. 302, Pittsburgh, Pa.,
584 F.2d 1297, 1304 (3rd Cir. 1978); United States v. One 1970 Ford Pickup, 564 F.2d 864, 865
(9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1976); In re Brenner, 6
F.2d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 1925). In United States v. Wilson, the court stated that a motion for return
of property cannot be resisted by the assertion that the property is subject to forfeiture, but only by
proof that actual forfeiture proceedings have been commenced. There is, however, no general
barrier to assertion of the state's right to forfeiture by setoff or counterclaim other than the pro-
scription on delay, which should modify the court's rule. 540 F.2d at 1104.
153. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1592, 1602-1604 (1976) govern forfeitures for violation of the customs laws.
Its procedure has been incorporated in several federal forfeiture laws, including those related to
gambling, 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (1976); see United States v. Premises Known As 608 Taylor Ave.,
Apt. 302, Pittsburgh, Pa., 584 F.2d 1297, 1304 (3rd Cir. 1978), counterfeiting, 49 U.S.C. § 784
(1976); see United States v. One Ford Pickup, 564 F.2d 864, 865 (9th Cir. 1977), and narcotics
laws, 21 U.S.C. § 88 1(d) (1976); see United States v. One Motor Yacht Named Mercury, 527 F.2d
1112, 1114 (Ist Cir. 1975).
Custom law, 19 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976), requires the seizing officer to report immediately the
seizure of property to the relevant administrative agency. The agency, in turn, must report to the
United States Attorney who, in turn, is required by § 1604 to conduct an immediate investigation
and start forfeiture proceedings. These provisions require prompt commencement of forfeiture
proceedings and permit delay only for that period of time reasonably necessary to investigate and
to resolve applications for remission; ie., a decision not to invoke the forfeiture remedy. See
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss3/14
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gest that the requirement has a constitutional basis. 15 4 The most thor-
oughly reasoned of these cases is Judge Turk's opinion for the Fourth
Circuit in States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz.155 Plaintiff brought suit
against customs officials on a constitutional and statutory theory for
consequential damages resulting from the seizure of general cargo for
customs violation and the administrative delay in resolving the forfei-
ture issue. The court concluded that the government violated plaintiff's
right to due process when it seized property for forfeiture and unrea-
sonably delayed in seeking a judicial determination of its forfeitability
claim over property it had confiscated.' 56
Although courts have recognized the application of this approach to
instruments-of-crime forfeitures,' 57 the justification may be slightly dif-
ferent. Because instruments-of-crime forfeitures usually arise as a pen-
alty for committing the crime, 58 it would seem to follow on first
consideration that the outside limit on commencement of forfeiture
proceedings should be identical with the statute of limitations and the
speedy-trial requirement applicable to prosecutions for the crime re-
lated to the forfeiture.159 Unlike a fine, however, a forfeiture penalty is
imposed long before any determination of guilt and often with no judi-
cial supervision or only ex parte supervision. Moreover, there is no
statutory provision for the owner of seized property to obtain compen-
sation in the event that the forfeiture effort is unsuccessful or aban-
doned. This uncompensated loss, 160  therefore, argues for the
United States v. One Motor Yacht Named Mercury, 527 F.2d 1112, 1114 (1st Cir. 1975); States
Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1155 (4th Cir. 1974); Sarkisian v. United States, 472
F.2d 468, 471 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
154. See United States v. One Ford Pickup, 564 F.2d 864, 866 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977); e. United
States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 367-75 (1971) (first amendment considerations
compel prompt proceedings regarding seized and allegedly obscene material).
155. 498 F.2d 1146, 1152-55 (4th Cir. 1974).
156. Id. at 1154.
157. See, e.g., United States v. One Ford Pickup, 564 F.2d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 1977).
158. See notes 139-43 supra and accompanying text.
159. Nominally, forfeiture is an in rem action against the offending instrument, see United
States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 (1971), and can proceed contempora-
neously with, or independently of, the criminal action. The res judicata and collateral estoppel
considerations are much like those discussed in connection with fruits of crime. See text accom-
panying notes 111-17 supra. It seems plausible to argue that despite the formalism of the in rem
action, it follows from the conclusion that the forfeiture of crime instruments is a penalty for the
crime; thus, a separate penalty proceeding violates the fifth amendment's double jeopardy pro-
scription. No credible authority, however, has been found for this position.
160. Cf. United States v. One Ford Pickup, 564 F.2d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 1977) (recognizing
rapid depreciation of automobile held by Secret Service).
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conclusion that due process requires a more prompt determination of
the government's claim of forfeitability than the period defined by the
statute of limitations or speedy-trial requirement of the sixth amend-
ment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Once the wide variety of seized property is categorized in accordance
with the reasons for its seizure, it is possible to develop a fairly straight-
forward body of rules for the disposition of seized property. Even the
deodand theory fits into a modem analysis of the proper disposition of
property seized under color of law. At the same time, the policies un-
derlying the imposition of penalties for crime could be imposed in a
more direct and sensible manner if civil courts simply treated the for-
feiture of crime instruments as they do a fine, permitting criminal
courts to impose the fine at the sentencing proceeding and to hold de-
fendant's property only insofar as it is necessary to secure payment of
the fine. 161
161. Due process considerations, of course, should govern the determination whether and for
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